



LANDING THE BLAME: OVERFISHING IN THE ATLANTIC 2017

WHICH MEMBER STATES ARE SETTING QUOTAS
ABOVE SCIENTIFIC ADVICE?

FISHERIES MINISTERS
RISK DAMAGING OUR
NATURAL RESOURCES
BEYOND REPAIR
BY CONSISTENTLY
SETTING FISHING
LIMITS ABOVE
SCIENTIFIC ADVICE.
THIS IS OUR THIRD
YEAR RUNNING A
SERIES OF BRIEFINGS
TO IDENTIFY WHICH
MEMBER STATES ARE
STANDING IN THE
WAY OF MORE FISH,
MORE PROFITS, AND
MORE JOBS FOR
EUROPEAN CITIZENS.

Food for an additional 89 million EU citizens. An extra €1.6 billion in annual revenue. Over 20,000 new jobs across the continent. Far from being a pipe dream, all of this could be a reality if we paid more attention to one of Europe's most significant natural resources – our seas.¹ If EU waters were properly managed – with damaged fish stocks rebuilt above levels that could support their maximum sustainable yield (MSY) – we could enjoy their full potential within a generation.²

FISHING LIMITS VS. SCIENTIFIC ADVICE

Every year, fisheries ministers have an opportunity to make this a reality when they agree on a Total Allowable Catch (TAC) for commercial fish stocks. Scientific bodies, predominantly the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES), provide information about the state of most stocks and recommend maximum catch levels.³ But for many years, this scientific advice has not been respected.

Our historical analysis of agreed TACs for all EU waters between 2001 and

2016 shows that, on average, 7 out of every 10 TACs were set above scientific advice. Whilst the percentage by which TACs were set above advice declined throughout this period (from 42% to 12%), the proportion of TACs set above advice did not.^{4,5}

The reformed Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) that entered into force in 2014 aims to restore and maintain populations of fish stocks above levels capable of supporting the MSY. The corresponding exploitation rate was to be achieved by 2015 where possible and by 2020 at the latest for all stocks.⁶ Following scientific advice is essential if we are to achieve this goal, end overfishing, and restore fish stocks to healthy levels.

AGREEMENTS BEHIND CLOSED DOORS

The negotiations over TACs are held by the Agricultural and Fisheries configuration of the Council of Ministers. These negotiations are not public, only their outcomes. This lack of transparency means that ministers are not on the hook when they ignore scientific advice and give priority to short-term interests that risk the health of fish stocks. This briefing, a continuation of the *Landing the Blame* series,⁷ reveals which Member States and ministers are behind decisions that go against the EU's long-term interests. This outcome is accomplished by analysing the outcomes of the negotiations and calculating which Member States end up with TACs above scientific advice. The key assumption is that these Member States are the main drivers of overfishing, either because they were actively pushing for fishing limits to be set above scientific advice, or they failed to prevent it from taking place.

ATLANTIC RESULTS

In the December 2016 negotiations, ministers set the TACs for the majority of commercial EU fish species for 2017 – a critical moment with significant implications for European fishers' livelihoods and the sustainable management of the natural resource. This analysis of 127 TAC decisions made (or confirmed) at this meeting, including 32 species fished in the waters of north-western Europe – from Portuguese waters to the Arctic Sea, was completed. It shows that where comparable scientific advice was available, 76 TACs were set above advice, amounting to over 217,000 tonnes of excess TAC. This is continuing the trend of permitting overfishing in EU waters with Atlantic TACs set 6% above scientific advice on average – a decrease from the 2016 TACs (13%). The earlier negotiations for the 2017 Baltic Sea TACs and the 2017/2018 Deep Sea TACs were also set above scientific advice, with *Landing the Blame* reports showing that 4 out of 10 TACs were set above scientific advice in the Baltic and 13 out of 21 TACs in the Deep Sea.


For the 2017 Atlantic TACs, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Ireland top the league table of Member States with the highest percentage of their TAC in excess of scientific advice (Table 1). These Member States were involved with TAC decisions that allow fishing at 10% above levels that scientists have determined to be consistent with the sustainable management of these fish stocks.

TABLE 1. THE OVERFISHING LEAGUE TABLE.

MEMBER STATE	MINISTER/ REPRESENTATIVE	EXCESS TAC (%)	EXCESS TAC (TONNES)
Belgium	Joke Schauvliege	10%	3,195
The Netherlands	Martijn Van Dam	10%	29,745
Ireland	Michael Creed	10%	19,423
United Kingdom	George Eustice	8%	46,854
France	Alain Vidalies	7%	21,430
Spain	Isabel García Tejerina	7%	17,387
Germany	Christian Schmidt	6%	12,227
Denmark	Esben Lunde Larsen	5%	44,559
Sweden	Sven-Erik Bucht	5%	10,803
Portugal	Ana Paula Vitorino	4%	3,632

Member states with fewer than five comparable TACs have been excluded as their summary statistics are disproportionately affected by outliers.

FIGURE 1. TOTAL EXCESS TAC BY EU MEMBER STATE.



2017 IN CONTEXT

The long-term trend is for a decreasing amount of excess TAC (Figure 2), a trend that 2017 continues, accounting for the comparisons of Baltic, Deep Sea, and Atlantic TACs with scientific advice. This is particularly troubling as


the CFP’s 2015 goal for limiting fishing exploitation rates has now passed and the policy requires a progressive reduction to the 2020 deadline.⁸

The number of TACs above advice (and the percentage) declined in the setting of 2017 TACs but remain alarmingly

high (Figure 3). In order for the CFP’s objectives to be fulfilled, excess TACs must decline to zero by 2020, but this is unlikely to happen if little progress is made on a yearly basis.


The full ICES and Council dataset used for the analysis in this briefing is available on the NEF website for download and further analysis.

FIGURE 2. HISTORIC TACS ABOVE ADVICE IN ALL EUROPEAN WATERS.



Note: Some updates to the historical time series have been made since older *Landing the Blame* briefings. The most significant change is that the estimate of EU share of blue whiting in the years where an agreement was not reached has been recalculated as 20.9% to reflect the 2006 agreement.

FIGURE 3. NUMBER OF TACS ABOVE ICES ADVICE.



The UK, Denmark, and the Netherlands are the worst offenders in terms of the total tonnage of TAC set above advice. Ministers representing these Member States have received the largest TAC increases above scientific advice in terms of tonnes and are therefore the most responsible for impeding the transition to sustainable fisheries in the EU.

Analysing total advice and excess TAC by Member State illustrates that excess TAC is not just a function of the total amount of fishing a Member State carries out (Figure 1). If that were the case, then each Member State's excess total TAC would be proportional to its total advice. Instead, we see a spectrum of excess TAC percentages, with some Member States frequently towards the top or bottom of these annual calculations. Although this does not in itself prove that the worst-offending Member States are pushing for higher TACs (that would require greater transparency around the negotiations), it is consistent with this thesis.

DISCUSSION

The 2017 results show insufficient progress towards fishing in line with scientific advice. As long as ministers delay bringing fishing rates to sustainable levels, stocks will not deliver optimally, costing revenue and jobs in the long run.

MINISTERIAL STATEMENTS

Each year, ministers emerge from these negotiations declaring victory for their fishing fleets, and 2017 was no exception. A new development is that some of these press statements also point to the importance of environmental sustainability and scientific advice, despite the clear departure when comparing outcomes. From fishing ministers, including those at the top of the league table, we hear that the agreed TACs are 'based on' or 'respect' scientific advice, although no minister actually claims that scientific advice has been 'followed' (see text box). All ministers, however, declare

MICHAEL CREED, MINISTER FOR IRELAND

"I am satisfied that I have managed to turn an extremely worrying set of proposals from the Commission into a much improved outcome for the Irish fishing industry. I am especially pleased that the quotas agreed respects the scientific advice ensuring that the fish stocks in our waters will be managed sustainably."⁹

ISABEL GARCÍA TEJERINA, MINISTER FOR SPAIN

"The policy promoted by the Government of Spain – based on the best possible scientific advice, rigorous control and defence of the sustainable use of resources – will lead to improved profitability and fishing conditions for the Spanish sector."¹⁰

that the best possible deal for the fishing industry was reached. This assessment was endorsed by some of the large fishing organisations, with the Scottish Fishermen's Federation describing the UK results as 'largely positive'¹¹ and the Killybegs Fishermen's Organisation describing the result for Ireland as 'very positive'.¹²

A LACK OF TRANSPARENCY AND DATA LIMITATIONS

Under Article 3 of the reformed CFP, 'transparency' is mentioned as one of the CFP's principles of good governance, yet the secretive negotiations in setting TACs and poor data availability undermine this, making the process less open to scrutiny. This study is therefore also limited in what it can achieve as data shortages prevent a comprehensive analysis. Member States at the top of the league table for excess TAC should therefore be major advocates of increased transparency, if judging performance by outcomes is insufficient.

Data on international TAC agreements are difficult to find, making it hard to properly apportion responsibility of overfishing. Also, the Commission and Council have not released their methods for calculating quota top-ups that have been included to respond to the landing obligation (LO). Some of the data that should be used to calculate quota top-ups are available in reports from the Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF) but as a full methodology is still missing, estimates of whether the top-ups were calculated correctly would be prone to error.

One particularly difficult issue is retrieving the TACs from third country agreements. As a result, TACs have to be assembled from press releases after

the negotiations are concluded.

A more official and finalised source would aid this important analysis. The Commission's online page for these agreements is incomplete in its coverage.¹³

Matching ICES and TAC zones is also a perennial issue that results in difficulties for civil society to properly hold representatives to account.¹⁴

LIMITS VS. CATCHES

It should be noted that the amount of fish caught is rarely the entirety of the agreed quota. For economic and biological reasons, fishing may fall under the quota whereas illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing may push fishing pressure above the agreed limit. Rather than analysing fishing pressure, this series of briefings specifically analyses the policy intent of the Council of Ministers.

THE LANDING OBLIGATION AND QUOTA TOP-UPS

The LO – part of the reformed CFP – requires vessels fishing certain stocks to land all their catches in an effort to reduce waste and unaccounted fishing mortality. 2017 is the third year of its implementation, with several demersal species being covered for the first time. ICES-advised fishing limits are usually given in terms of landings, but for stocks that are under the LO, they need to be given as a catch value. Additionally, some vessels under the LO are given exemptions that allow them to discard given quantities of fish if it is not feasible to reduce discards or when discarded fish are likely to survive.

For the 2017 TACs, several stocks that are now under the LO received quota top-ups (also referred to as quota uplift) in order to account for

their increased landings of previously discarded fish. This process also took place for several TACs in 2016. The reasoning behind the quota top-ups is that before the LO, additional fish that would have died at sea as discards are now being landed and counted against quota, while the level of fishing mortality does not change. This assumes that the LO is being enforced, otherwise the quota top-ups simply function as additional quota and would lead to higher fishing mortality.

These quota top-ups present data issues, as ICES catch advice needs to be modified to cover only for those stocks and vessels under the LO with adjustments made to cover the various exemptions. This is a very difficult task because easily accessible data on vessel types and discards are not available and the Commission does not provide information on how it carries out calculations in proposing TACs.

For this study, the top-up percentages were reversed to allow the agreed TACs to be compared directly to the ICES landings advice. This approach focuses on whether the TAC follows scientific advice, rather than attempting to evaluate the application of quota top-ups with little information available. De minimis exemptions are not applied in comparing agreed TACs to catch advice as discarding is assumed to be low for pelagic stocks.

This analysis reveals that 12 of the 23 TACs that received top-ups were already above scientific advice on landings before the quota top-up was added. Some TACs, for example southern hake, had an agreed TAC before the quota top-up that was higher than both the landings and the catch advice. In these situations the methodology behind the top-ups

is not relevant as the TAC will inevitably be higher than the adjusted catch advice.

MACKEREL REVISION

The ICES advice for Northeast mackerel contained an error where stock size was overestimated during the assessment phase. When this error was corrected the corresponding advice declined from 944,302 to 857,185 tonnes – a decrease of 9%. Unfortunately this revision took place in January, after the Council negotiations were already concluded.

For this analysis, the older, pre-Council mackerel advice was used as this was the knowledge at the time of the Council negotiations. However, due to the significant size of the mackerel stock, this decision increases/decreases Ireland and the UK by 4% and Spain, The Netherlands, Portugal, France, and Germany by 1%.

OFFTRACK FOR 2020

Article 2.2 of the CFP calls for fish stocks to be at levels that can support the maximum sustainable yield 'by 2015 where possible and, on a progressive, incremental basis at the latest by 2020 for all stocks'. With the 2020 deadline fast approaching, EU fisheries are not on track, with calculations showing that at the current rate it will take until 2034 to meet the sustainability policy objective.¹⁵

No impact assessments have been published by the European Commission or other actors to justify this delay. The only socio-economic evidence that has been published is from Member States on the impact of the Commission's TAC proposal. This evidence is not not only methodologically weak in terms of omitting cost reductions, quota uptake,

and price elasticities, it is focused on the economic impact for only one year – entirely missing the purpose of TACs as a tool for stock recovery over multiple years.¹⁶ This is crucially important as a study in the *Journal of Marine Policy* found that the earlier the transition to sustainable fisheries in the northeast Atlantic, the larger the net benefits (as measured in net present value)¹⁷ – a result that has also been found for US fisheries.¹⁸

The consequence of this delay is that come 2020 there will be a need for large TAC reductions across many species, with potentially large socio-economic consequences. At this point it will be clear that more effort to restore fish stocks should have been made earlier – especially during the current period where overall fleet profits are high due to low oil prices and an increasing abundance of some fish stocks. Easing the impact of the 2020 deadline must start with the TAC decisions made later this year.

ENDNOTES

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ANNEX

ATLANTIC TACS COMPARED TO SCIENTIFIC ADVICE (TONNES)

Species	Area	Scientific advice (tonnes)	TAC agreed by ministers (tonnes)	Excess TAC (tonnes)	Excess TAC (%)	Belgium	Denmark	France	Germany	Ireland	The Netherlands	Portugal	Spain	Sweden	United Kingdom
Anchovy	VIII	33,000	33,000	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Anglerfish	VIIIc, IX and X; Union waters of CECAF 34.1.1	4,375	3,955	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Anglerfish	Union waters of IIa and IV	13,125	13,521	396	3%	14	31	3	15	0	11	0	0	0	322
Anglerfish	Norwegian waters of IV	1,456	1,500	44	3%	1	34	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	8
Anglerfish	VI; Union and international waters of Vb; international waters of XII and XIV	7,426	7,650	224	3%	8	0	99	9	22	8	0	9	0	69
Anglerfish	VII	29,535	33,516	3,981	13%	368	0	2,361	41	302	48	0	146	0	716
Anglerfish	VIIIabde	7,913	8,980	1,067	13%	0	0	904	0	0	0	0	163	0	0
Basking shark	EC waters of zones IV, VI and VII	0	0	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Blue ling	Union and international waters of Vb, VI, VII	11,014	11,014	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Blue ling	International waters of XII	0	357	357	0%	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	341	0	3
Blue ling	Union and international waters of II and IV	0	53	53	0%	0	4	23	4	4	0	0	0	0	14
Blue ling	Union and international waters of III	0	8	8	0%	0	3	0	2	0	0	0	0	3	0
Blue whiting	VIIIc, IX and X; Union waters of CECAF 34.1.1	51,719	51,719	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Blue whiting	Union and international waters of I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIIIa, VIIIb, VIIIc, VIIIe, XII and XIV	385,254	385,254	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Blue whiting	Faroese waters	2,500	2,500	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Blue whiting	Norwegian waters of II and IV	220,494	220,494	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Boarfish	Union and international waters of VI, VII and VIII	27,288	27,288	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Capelin	IIb	0	0	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cod	IV; Union waters of IIa; that part of IIIa not covered by the Skagerrak and Kattegat	27,400	29,327	1,927	7%	69	394	85	250	0	223	0	0	3	904
Cod	I, IIb	29,737	33,025	3,288	11%	0	0	309	652	0	0	263	1,309	0	435
Cod	Norwegian waters of I and II	20,712	23,002	2,290	11%	0	0	254	277	34	0	309	309	0	1,074
Cod	Kattegat	129	525	396	307%	0	244	0	5	0	0	0	0	146	0

Species	Area	Scientific advice (tonnes)	TAC agreed by ministers (tonnes)	Excess TAC (tonnes)	Excess TAC (%)	Belgium	Denmark	France	Germany	Ireland	The Netherlands	Portugal	Spain	Sweden	United Kingdom
Cod	Skagerrak	4,563	4,884	321	7%	1	265	0	7	0	2	0	0	46	0
Cod	Vlb; Union and international waters of Vb west of 12° 00' W and of XII and XIV	17	74	57	335%	0	0	9	1	12	0	0	0	0	35
Cod	Vla; Union and international waters of Vb east of 12° 00' W	0	0	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cod	VIIa	0	146	146	0%	2	0	5	0	97	0	0	0	0	42
Cod	VIIb, VIIc, VIIe-k, VIII, IX and X; Union waters of CECAF 34.1.1	1,447	2,830	1,383	96%	53	0	874	0	361	0	0	0	0	94
Cod	VIIId	1,924	2,059	135	7%	6	0	114	0	0	3	0	0	0	12
Common sole	IIIa; Union waters of Subdivisions 22-32	534	534	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Common sole	VIIhjk	223	382	159	71%	13	0	27	0	71	21	0	0	0	27
Common sole	Union waters of IIa and IV	14,178	15,030	852	6%	71	32	14	57	0	641	0	0	0	37
Common sole	VIIa	0	40	40	0%	10	0	0	0	17	3	0	0	0	10
Common sole	VIIbc	30	42	12	40%	0	0	2	0	10	0	0	0	0	0
Common sole	VIIId	2,257	2,550	293	13%	79	0	158	0	0	0	0	0	0	56
Common sole	VIIe	1,178	1,178	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Common sole	VIIIfg	782	840	58	7%	36	0	4	0	2	0	0	0	0	16
Common sole	VIIIab	3,107	3,420	313	10%	4	0	287	0	0	22	0	1	0	0
Dab and flounder	Union waters of IIa and IV	10,484	18,434	7,950	76%	217	814	85	1,221	0	4,926	0	0	3	685
Greater silver smelt	Union and international waters of I and II	66	90	24	36%	0	0	2	6	0	5	0	0	0	10
Greater silver smelt	Union waters of III and IV	756	1,028	272	36%	0	241	2	2	2	11	0	0	9	4
Greater silver smelt	Union and international waters of V, VI and VII	3,453	3,884	431	12%	0	0	1	33	31	343	0	0	0	24
Haddock	IIIa, Union waters of Subdivisions 22-32	2,011	1,982	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Haddock	Union and international waters of Vlb, XII and XIV	4,690	4,130	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Haddock	Union and international waters of Vb and VIa	3,218	3,171	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Species	Area	Scientific advice (tonnes)	TAC agreed by ministers (tonnes)	Excess TAC (tonnes)	Excess TAC (%)	Belgium	Denmark	France	Germany	Ireland	The Netherlands	Portugal	Spain	Sweden	United Kingdom
Haddock	IV; Union waters of IIa	26,798	26,405	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Haddock	VIIb-k, VIII, IX and X; Union waters of CECAF 34.1.1	7,751	7,751	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Haddock	VIIa	682	1,558	876	128%	14	0	63	0	379	0	0	0	0	419
Hake	IIIa; Union waters of Subdivisions 22-32	3,371	3,371	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hake	VIIIc, IX and X; Union waters of CECAF 34.1.1	6,838	9,776	2,938	43%	0	0	180	0	0	0	877	1,880	0	0
Hake	Union waters of IIa and IV	3,928	3,928	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hake	VI and VII; Union and international waters of Vb international waters of XII and XIV	62,728	62,728	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hake	VIIIabde	41,838	41,837	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Herring	IV, VIId and Union waters of IIa	7,888	11,375	3,487	44%	17	3,338	17	17	0	17	0	0	16	63
Herring	IIIa (by-catches)	6,659	6,659	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Herring	Union and international waters of I and II	42,059	42,059	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Herring	Union and international waters of Vb, VIb and VIaN	0	4,170	4,170	0%	0	0	88	466	630	466	0	0	0	2,520
Herring	Union and Norwegian waters of IV north of 53° 30' N	275,187	288,788	13,601	5%	0	3,897	1,110	2,403	0	2,839	0	0	231	3,121
Herring	IIIa	40,865	43,573	2,708	7%	0	1,314	0	21	0	0	0	0	1,374	0
Herring	IVc, VIId	50,460	52,954	2,494	5%	438	57	619	35	0	1,105	0	0	0	240
Herring	Norwegian waters south of 62° N	1,097	1,151	54	5%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	54	0
Herring	VIaS, VIIb, VIIc	0	1,630	1,630	0%	0	0	0	0	1,482	148	0	0	0	0
Herring	VIIa	4,127	4,127	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Herring	VIIg,h,j,k	16,145	14,467	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Horse mackerel	Union waters of IIa, IVa; VI, VIIa-c, VIIe-k, VIIIa, VIIIb, VIIIc and VIIIe; Union and international waters of Vb; international waters of XII and XIV	58,590	82,229	23,639	40%	0	2,340	940	1,826	6,081	7,326	240	2,490	194	2,202
Horse mackerel	Union waters of IVb, IVc and VIId	14,697	14,697	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Horse mackerel	IX	73,349	73,349	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Species	Area	Scientific advice (tonnes)	TAC agreed by ministers (tonnes)	Excess TAC (tonnes)	Excess TAC (%)	Belgium	Denmark	France	Germany	Ireland	The Netherlands	Portugal	Spain	Sweden	United Kingdom
Horse mackerel	VIIIc	9,456	13,271	3,815	40%	0	0	59	0	0	0	338	3,418	0	0
Lemon sole and witch flounder	Union waters of IIa and IV	5,848	6,391	543	9%	29	81	22	10	0	67	0	0	1	332
Ling	Union and international waters of VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XII and XIV	8,423	13,696	5,273	63%	20	3	1,549	72	388	0	3	1,453	0	1,784
Ling	IIIa; Union waters of IIIbcd	54	87	33	63%	2	19	0	2	0	0	0	0	7	2
Ling	Union and international waters of I and II	11,300	36	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ling	Union and international waters of V	6,730	33	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ling	Union waters of IV	2,149	3,494	1,345	63%	8	135	75	83	0	3	0	0	6	1,035
Mackerel	Norwegian waters of IIa and IVa	14,802	16,004	1,202	8%	0	1,202	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mackerel	IIIa and IV; Union waters of IIa, IIIb, IIIc and Sub-divisions 22-32	32,635	35,286	2,651	8%	48	1,655	151	50	0	152	0	0	453	141
Mackerel	VI, VII, VIIIa, VIIIb, VIIIc and VIIIe; Union and international waters of Vb; international waters of IIa,	376,906	407,517	30,611	8%	0	0	1,299	1,948	6,492	2,840	0	2	0	17,854
Mackerel	VIIIc, IX and X; Union waters of CECAF 34.1.1	43,128	46,631	3,503	8%	0	0	19	0	0	0	597	2,887	0	0
Megrim	VII	12,477	13,691	1,214	10%	33	0	442	0	174	0	0	364	0	174
Megrim	Union waters of IIa and IV	2,639	2,639	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Megrim	Union and international waters of Vb; VI; international waters of XII and XIV	5,242	5,242	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Megrim	VIIIabde	1,232	1,352	120	10%	0	0	54	0	0	0	0	66	0	0
Megrim	VIIIc, IX and X; Union waters of CECAF 34.1.1	1,055	1,159	104	10%	0	0	5	0	0	0	3	96	0	0
Northern prawn	IIIa	7,327	3,738	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Northern prawn	Union waters of IIa and IV	0	2,446	2,446	0%	0	1,818	0	0	0	17	0	0	73	538
Norway lobster	VII	19,241	23,020	3,779	20%	0	0	919	0	1,394	0	0	227	0	1,239
Norway lobster	VIIIc; Union waters of CECAF 34.1.1	0	0	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Norway lobster	Union waters of IIa and IV	19,771	19,771	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Species	Area	Scientific advice (tonnes)	TAC agreed by ministers (tonnes)	Excess TAC (tonnes)	Excess TAC (%)	Belgium	Denmark	France	Germany	Ireland	The Netherlands	Portugal	Spain	Sweden	United Kingdom
Norway lobster	IIIa; Union waters of Subdivisions 22-32	12,715	12,715	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Norway lobster	VI; Union and international waters of Vb	16,317	16,317	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Norway lobster	VIIIabde	4,160	4,160	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Norway lobster	IX and X	336	336	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Norway pout	IIIa; Union waters of IIa and IV	212,925	141,950	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Plaice	VIIa	436	1,098	662	152%	17	0	7	0	463	5	0	0	0	169
Plaice	IV; Union waters of IIa; that part of IIIa not covered by the Skagerrak and the Kattegat	99,680	119,389	19,709	20%	1,213	3,942	227	1,137	0	7,581	0	0	0	5,610
Plaice	VIIbc	30	74	44	147%	0	0	7	0	37	0	0	0	0	0
Plaice	VIIde	10,022	10,022	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Plaice	VIIIfg	405	405	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Plaice	VIIhjk	86	128	42	49%	3	0	5	0	18	11	0	0	0	5
Plaice	VIII, IX and X; Union waters of CECAF 34.1.1	194	395	201	104%	0	0	134	0	0	0	34	34	0	0
Plaice	Skagerrak	14,053	16,831	2,779	20%	17	2,207	0	11	0	425	0	0	118	0
Plaice	Kattegat	2,065	2,065	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pollack	VII	4,067	12,141	8,074	199%	251	0	5,783	0	616	0	0	15	0	1,408
Pollack	VIIIc	164	231	67	41%	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	61	0	0
Pollack	VI; Union and international waters of Vb; international waters of XII and XIV	133	397	264	199%	0	0	126	0	37	0	0	4	0	96
Pollack	VIIIabde	1,050	1,482	432	41%	0	0	358	0	0	0	0	73	0	0
Pollack	IX and X; Union waters of CECAF 34.1.1	200	282	82	41%	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	80	0	0
Redfish	Union and international waters of V; international waters of XII and XIV (shallow pelagic)	0	0	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Redfish	Union and international waters of V; international waters of XII and XIV (deep pelagic)	8,159	1,159	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Saithe	IIIa and IV; Union waters of IIa, IIIb, IIIc and Subdivisions 22-32	64,363	46,001	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Species	Area	Scientific advice (tonnes)	TAC agreed by ministers (tonnes)	Excess TAC (tonnes)	Excess TAC (%)	Belgium	Denmark	France	Germany	Ireland	The Netherlands	Portugal	Spain	Sweden	United Kingdom
Sole	VIIIc, VIId, VIIE, IX and X; Union waters of CECAF 34.1.1	724	1,072	348	48%	0	0	0	0	0	0	217	131	0	0
Sprat	IIIa	9,040	30,784	21,744	241%	0	15,751	0	33	0	0	0	0	5,959	0
Sprat	Union waters of IIa and IV	33,830	33,830	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sprat	VIIde	3,678	4,120	442	12%	2	144	31	2	0	31	0	0	0	232
Spurdog/dogfish	Union and international waters of I, V, VI, VII, VIII, XII and XIV	0	270	270	0%	20	0	83	4	53	0	0	10	0	100
Turbot and brill	Union waters of IIa and IV	4,488	4,937	449	10%	33	70	8	18	0	250	0	0	0	69
Tusk	IIIa; Union waters of Subdivisions 22-32	29	29	0	1%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tusk	Union waters of IV	233	235	2	1%	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
Tusk	Norwegian waters of IV	168	170	2	1%	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tusk	Union and international waters of I, II and XIV	9,492	21	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tusk	Union and international waters of V, VI and VII	928	937	9	1%	0	0	5	0	1	0	0	0	0	3
Whiting	IIIa	133	1,031	898	678%	0	810	0	0	0	3	0	0	86	0
Whiting	VIIa	0	80	80	0%	0	0	3	0	46	0	0	0	0	31
Whiting	VIII	1,613	2,540	927	57%	0	0	556	0	0	0	0	371	0	0
Whiting	IV; Union waters of IIa	8,952	12,566	3,614	40%	77	335	503	87	0	193	0	0	1	2,418
Whiting	VI; Union and international waters of Vb; international waters of XII and XIV	11	213	202	1836%	0	0	25	1	61	0	0	0	0	116
Whiting	VIIb, VIIc, VIId, VIIE, VIIf, VIIg, VIIh, VIIj and VIIk	25,135	22,930	0	0%	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
					Total	3,195	41,183	21,108	10,811	19,318	29,745	2,883	15,939	8,785	46,522

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